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Abstract
Voter control problems model situations such as an external agent trying to affect the
result of an election by adding voters, for example by convincing some voters to vote who
would otherwise not attend the election. Traditionally, voters are added one at a time, with
the goal of making a distinguished alternative win by adding a minimum number of voters.
In this paper, we initiate the study of combinatorial variants of control by adding voters:
In our setting, when we choose to add a voter v, we also have to add a whole bundle κ(v) of
voters associated with v. We study the computational complexity of this problem for two
of the most basic voting rules, namely the Plurality rule and the Condorcet rule.
1 Introduction
We study the computational complexity of control by adding voters [2, 24], investigating the case
where the sets of voters that we can add have some combinatorial structure. The problem of
election control by adding voters models situations where some agent (e.g., a campaign manager
for one of the alternatives) tries to ensure a given alternative’s victory by convincing some
undecided voters to vote. Traditionally, in this problem we are given a description of an election
(that is, a set C of alternatives and a set V of voters who decided to vote), and also a set
W of undecided voters (for each voter in V ∪ W we assume to know how this voter intends
to vote which is given by a linear order of the set C; we might have good approximation of
this knowledge from preelection polls). Our goal is to ensure that our preferred alternative p
becomes a winner, by convincing as few voters from W to vote as possible (provided that it is
at all possible to ensure p’s victory in this way).
Control by adding voters corresponds, for example, to situations where supporters of a given
alternative make direct appeals to other supporters of the alternative to vote (for example,
they may stress the importance of voting, or help with the voting process by offering rides to
the voting locations, etc.). Unfortunately, in its traditional phrasing, control by adding voters
∗LB was supported by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. JC was supported by the Studienstiftung
des Deutschen Volkes. PF has been supported by the DFG project PAWS (NI 369/10). NT is supported by
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does not model larger-scale attempts at convincing people to vote. For example, a campaign
manager might be interested in airing a TV advertisement that would motivate supporters of
a given alternative to vote (though, of course, it might also motivate some of this alternative’s
enemies), or maybe launch viral campaigns, where friends convince their own friends to vote.
It is clear that the sets of voters that we can add should have some sort of a combinatorial
structure. For instance, a TV advertisement appeals to a particular group of voters and we
can add all of them at the unit cost of airing the advertisement. A public speech in a given
neighborhood will convince a particular group of people to vote at a unit cost of organizing the
meeting or convincing a person to vote will “for free” also convince her friends to vote.
The goal of our work is to formally define an appropriate computational problem modeling
a combinatorial variant of control by adding voters and to study its computational complexity.
Specifically, we focus on the Plurality rule and the Condorcet rule, mainly because the Plurality
rule is the most widely used rule in practice, and it is one of the few rules for which the standard
variant of control by adding voters is solvable in polynomial time [2], whereas for the Condorcet
rule the problem is polynomial-time solvable for the case of single-peaked elections [18]. For the
case of single-peaked elections, in essence, all our hardness results for the Condorcet rule directly
translate to all Condorcet-consistent voting rules, a large and important family of voting rules.
We defer the formal details, definitions, and concrete results to the following sections. Instead,
we state the high-level, main messages of our work:
• Many typical variants of combinatorial control by adding voters are intractable, but there
is also a rich landscape of tractable cases.
• Assuming that voters have single-peaked preferences does not lower the complexity of the
problem (even though it does so in many election problems [7, 10, 18]). On the contrary,
assuming single-crossing preferences does lower the complexity of the problem.
We believe that our setting of combinatorial control, and—more generally—combinatorial voting,
offers a very fertile ground for future research and we intend the current paper as an initial step.
Related Work. Bartholdi et al. [2] first studied the concept of election control by adding/deleting
voters or alternatives in a given election. They studied the constructive variant of the problem,
where the goal is to ensure a given alternative’s victory (and we focus on this variant of the
problem as well). The destructive variant, where the goal is to prevent someone from winning,
was introduced by Hemaspaandra et al. [24]. These papers focused on the Plurality rule and
the Condorcet rule (and the Approval rule, for the destructive case of Hemaspaandra et al.
[24]). Since then, many other researchers extended this study to a number of other rules and
models [3, 16, 17, 19, 28, 27, 31, 33].
In all previous work on election control, the authors always assumed that one could affect
each entity of the election at unit cost only. For example, one could add a voter at a unit cost
and adding two voters always was twice as expensive as adding a single voter. Only the paper
of Faliszewski et al. [19], where the authors study control in weighted elections, could be seen
as an exception: One could think of adding a voter of weight w as adding a group of w voters
of unit weight. On the one hand, the weighted election model does not allow one to express rich
combinatorial structures as those that we study here, and on the other hand, in our study we
consider unweighted elections only (though adding weights to our model would be seamless).
The specific combinatorial flavor of our model has been inspired by the seminal work of
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Rothkopf et al. [35]1 on combinatorial auctions (see, e.g., Sandholm [36] for additional infor-
mation). There, bidders can place bids on combinations of items such that the bid on the
combination of a set of items might be less than, equal to, or greater than the sum of the in-
dividual bids on each element from the same set of items. While in combinatorial auctions one
“bundles” items to bid on, in our scenario one bundles voters.
In the computational social choice literature, combinatorial voting is typically associated
with scenarios where voters express opinions over a set of items that themselves have a specific
combinatorial structure (typically, one uses CP-nets to model preferences over such alternative
sets [6]). For example, Conitzer et al. [11] studied a form of control in this setting and Mattei
et al. [30] studied bribery problems. In contrast, we use the standard model of elections where
all alternatives and preference orders are given explicitly, but we have a combinatorial structure
of the sets of voters that can be added.
2 Preliminaries
We assume familiarity with standard notions regarding algorithms and complexity theory. For
each nonnegative integer z, we write [z] to mean {1, . . . , z}.
Elections. An election E := (C, V ) consists of a set C of m alternatives and a set V of
|V | voters v1, v2, . . . , v|V |. Each voter v has a linear order ≻v over the set C, which we call
a preference order. For example, let C = {c1, c2, c3} be a set of alternatives. The preference
order c1 ≻v c2 ≻v c3 of voter v indicates that v likes c1 the best (1
st position), then c2, and
c3 the least (3
rd position). We call a voter v ∈ V a c-voter if c is at the first position of her
preference order. Given a subset C′ ⊆ C of alternatives, if not stated explicitly, we write 〈C′〉
to denote an arbitrary but fixed preference order over C′.
Voting Rules. A voting rule R is a function that given an election E outputs a (possibly
empty) set R(E) ⊆ C of the (tied) election winners. We study the Plurality rule and the
Condorcet rule. Given an election, the Plurality score of an alternative c is the number of voters
that have c at the first position in their preference orders; an alternative is a Plurality winner if it
has the maximum Plurality score. An alternative c is a Condorcet winner [12] if it beats all other
alternatives in head-to-head contests. That is, c is a Condorcet winner in election E = (C, V )
if for each alternative c′ ∈ C \ {c} it holds that |{v ∈ V | c ≻v c′}| > |{v ∈ V | c′ ≻v c}|.
Condorcet’s rule elects the (unique) Condorcet winner if it exists, and returns an empty set
otherwise. A voting rule is Condorcet-consistent if it elects a Condorcet winner when there is
one (however, if there is no Condorcet winner, then a Condorcet-consistent rule is free to provide
any set of winners).
Domain Restrictions. Intuitively, an election is single-peaked [5] if it is possible to order the
alternatives on a line in such a way that for each voter v the following holds: If c is v’s most
preferred alternative, then for each two alternatives ci and cj that both are on the same side
of c (with respect to the ordering of the alternatives on the line), among ci and cj , v prefers
the one closer to c. For example, single-peaked elections arise when we view the alternatives
1According to google scholar, accessed April 2014, cited more than 1000 times.
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on the standard political left-right spectrum and voters form their preferences based solely on
alternatives’ positions on this spectrum. Formally, we have the following definition.
Definition 1 (Single-peaked elections). Let C be a set of alternative and let L be a linear
order over C (referred to as the societal axis). We say that a preference order ≻ (over C) is
single-peaked with respect to L if for each three alternative x, y, z ∈ C it holds that:
((x L y L z) ∨ (z L y L x)) =⇒ ((x ≻ y) =⇒ (y ≻ z)) .
An election (C, V ) is single-peaked with respect to L if the preference order of each voter in V is
single-peaked with respect to L. An election is single-peaked if there is a societal axis with respect
to which it is single-peaked.
There are polynomial-time algorithms that given an election decide if it is single-peaked and,
if so, provide a societal axis for it [1, 15]. Single-crossing elections, introduced by Roberts [34],
capture a similar idea as single-peaked ones, but from a different perspective. This time we
assume that it is possible to order the voters so that for each two alternatives a and b either all
voters rank a and b identically, or there is a single point along this order where voters switch from
preferring one of the alternatives to preferring the other one. Formally, we have the following
definition.
Definition 2 (Single-crossing elections). An election E = (C, V ) is single-crossing if there is
an order L over V such that for each two alternatives x and y and each three voters v1, v2, v3
such that v1 L v2 L v3 it holds that:
(x ≻v1 y ∧ x ≻v3 y) =⇒ x ≻v2 y.
As for the case of single-peakedness, there are polynomial-time algorithms that decide if an
election is single-crossing and, if so, produce the voter order witnessing this fact [14, 8].
Combinatorial Bundling Functions. Given a voter set X , a combinatorial bundling func-
tion κ : X → 2X (abbreviated as bundling function) is a function assigning to each voter a subset
of voters. For convenience, for each subset X ′ ⊆ X , we let κ(X ′) =
⋃
x∈X′ κ(x). For x ∈ X , κ(x)
is called x’s bundle (and for this bundle, x is called its leader). We assume that x ∈ κ(x) and so
κ(x) is never empty. We typically write b to denote the maximum bundle size under a given κ
(which will always be clear from context). Intuitively, we use combinatorial bundling functions
to describe the sets of voters that we can add to an election at a unit cost. For example, one
can think of κ(x) as the group of voters that join the election under x’s influence. We represent
bundling functions explicitly: For each voter x we list the voters in κ(x).
We are interested in various special cases of bundling functions. We say that κ is leader-
anonymous if for each two voters x and y with the same preference order κ(x) = κ(y) holds.
Furthermore, κ is follower-anonymous if for each two voters x and y with the same preference
orders, and each voter z, it holds that x ∈ κ(z) if and only if y ∈ κ(z). We call κ anonymous
if it is both leader-anonymous and follower-anonymous. One possible way of thinking about an
anonymous bundling function is that it is a function assigning to each preference order appearing
in the input a subset of the preference orders appearing in the input. For example, anonymous
bundling functions naturally model scenarios such as airing TV advertisements that appeal to
particular groups of voters.
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The swap distance between two voters vi and vj is the minimum number of swaps of consec-
utive alternatives that transform vi’s preference order into that of vj . Given a number d ∈ N,
we call κ a full-d bundling function if for each x ∈ X , κ(x) is exactly the set of all y ∈ X such
that the swap distance between the preference orders of x and y is at most d.
We introduce the concept of a bundling graph of an election, which, roughly speaking, models
how the bundles of two voters interact with each other.
Definition 3 (Bundling graphs). Given an input instance to C-CC-AV, the bundling graph is
a simple and directed graph G = (V (G), E(G)). For each voter x there is a vertex ux ∈ V (G),
and for each two distinct voters y and z such that y ∈ κ(z) there is an arc (uz → uy) ∈ E(G).
For arbitrary bundling functions, the bundling graph is a directed graph. However, if κ is a
full-d bundling function, that is, for each voter v, κ(v) contains all the voters at swap distance d,
then the bundling graph can be thought of as being undirected, due to the following.
Lemma 1. If κ is a full-d bundling function, then for any unregistered voter x and any y ∈ κ(x),
it holds that x ∈ κ(y).
Proof. To see why the statement holds, notice that for any two voters x and y, if y ∈ κ(x),
then the swap distance between x and y is at most d, therefore, because κ is a full-d bundling
function, x must be in κ(y). This implies that for any arc (ux → uy) in the bundling graph, the
corresponding arc (uy → ux) is also present in the bundling graph, therefore, we can treat the
bundling graph as an undirected graph.
Notice that this is not always the case for an arbitrary bundling function. For instance,
κ(x) = {x, y}, κ(y) = {y} is a valid possibility for a bundling function.
Central Problem. We consider the following problem for a given voting rule R:
R Combinatorial Constructive Control by Adding Voters
(R-C-CC-AV)
Input: An election E = (C, V ), a set W of (unregistered) voters with V ∩W = ∅, a
bundling function κ :W → 2W , a preferred alternative p ∈ C, and a bound k ∈ N.
Question: Is there a subset of voters W ′ ⊆ W of size at most k such that p ∈
R(C, V ∪ κ(W ′)), where R(C,X) is the set of winners of the election (C,X) under
the rule R ?
We note that we use here a so-called nonunique-winner model. For a control action to be
successful, it suffices for p to be one of the tied winners. Throughout this work, we refer to the
set W ′ of voters such that p wins election (C, V ∪ κ(W ′)) as the solution and denote k as the
solution size.
R-C-CC-AV is a generalization of the well-studied problemR Constructive Control by
Adding Voters (R-CC-AV) (in which κ is fixed so that for each w ∈W we have κ(w) = {w}).
The non-combinatorial problem CC-AV is polynomial-time solvable for the Plurality rule [2],
but is NP-complete for the Condorcet rule [28], therefore:
Observation 1. Condorcet-C-CC-AV is NP-hard even if the maximum bundle size b is one.
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m n k b d
# alternatives (m)
Non-anonymous: W[2]-h wrt. k even if m = 2 [Thm. 2]
Anonymous: ILP-FPT wrt. m [Thm. 3]
# unreg. voters (n) FPT wrt. n
solution size (k)
XP [Obs. 2]
Single-peaked & full-1 κ:
W[1]-h wrt. k [Thm. 8]
Anonymous & b = 3:
W[1]-h wrt. k [Thm. 1]
max. bundle size (b)
b = 2 : NP-h [Thm. 4] and P for full-d κ [Thm. 5]
b = 3 : NP-h even for full-d κ [Thm. 6]
b ≥ 4 : NP-h even for full-1 κ [Thm. 7]
max. swap dist. (d)
d = 1: W[1]-h wrt. k [Thm. 8]
Single-crossing & full-d κ: P [Thm. 9]
Table 1: Computational complexity classification of Plurality-C-CC-AV (since the non-
combinatorial problem CC-AV is already NP-hard for Condorcet’s rule, we concentrate here on
the Plurality rule). Each row and column in the table corresponds to a parameter such that
each cell contains results for the two corresponding parameters combined. Due to symmetry,
there is no need to consider the cells under the main diagonal, therefore they are painted in gray.
ILP-FPT means FPT based on a formulation as an integer linear program.
Parameterized Complexity. An instance (I, k) of a parameterized problem consists of the
actual instance I and an integer k being the parameter [13, 20, 32]. A parameterized problem is
called fixed-parameter tractable (is in FPT) if there is an algorithm solving it in f(k)·|I|O(1) time,
for an arbitrary computable function f only depending on parameter k, whereas an algorithm
with running-time |I|f(k) only shows membership in the class XP (clearly, FPT ⊆ XP). If
a parameterized problem is fixed-parameter tractable due to a formulation as integer linear
program (ILP), then we say that this problem is in ILP-FPT. One can show that a parameterized
problem L is (presumably) not fixed-parameter tractable by devising a parameterized reduction
from a W[1]-hard or a W[2]-hard problem (such as Clique or Set Cover parameterized by the
“solution size”) to L. A parameterized reduction from a parameterized problem L to another
parameterized problem L′ is a function that, given an instance (I, k), computes in f(k) · |I|O(1)
time an instance (I ′, k′), such that k′ ≤ g(k) and (I, k) ∈ L ⇔ (I ′, k′) ∈ L′. Betzler et al. [4]
survey parameterized complexity investigations in voting.
Our Contributions. We introduce a new model for combinatorial control in voting. As
R-C-CC-AV is generally NP-hard even for R being the Plurality rule, we show several fixed-
parameter tractability results for some of the natural parameterizations of R-C-CC-AV; we
almost completely resolve the complexity of C-CC-AV, for the Plurality rule and the Condorcet
rule, as a function of the maximum bundle size b and the maximum distance d from a voter v to
the farthest element of her bundle. Further, we show that the problem remains hard even when
restricting the elections to be single-peaked, but that it is polynomial-time solvable when we
focus on single-crossing elections. Our results for Plurality elections are summarized in Table 1.
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3 Complexity for Unrestricted Elections
In this section we provide our results for the case of unrestricted elections, where voters may have
arbitrary preference orders. In the next section we will consider single-peaked and single-crossing
elections that only allow “reasonable” preference orders.
3.1 Number of Voters, Number of Alternatives, and Solution Size
We start our discussion by considering parameters “the number m of alternatives”, “the number
n of unregistered voters”, and “the solution size k”. A simple brute-force algorithm, checking all
possible combinations of k bundles, proves that both Plurality-C-CC-AV and Condorcet-
C-CC-AV are in XP for parameter k, and in FPT for parameter n (the latter holds because
k ≤ n). Indeed, the same result holds for all voting rules that are XP/FPT-time computable for
the respective parameters.
Observation 2. Both Plurality-C-CC-AV and Condorcet-C-CC-AV are solvable in O(nk·
n ·m ·winner) time, where winner is the complexity of determining Plurality/Condorcet winners.
The XP result for Plurality-C-CC-AV with respect to the parameter k probably cannot
be improved to fixed-parameter tractability. Indeed, for parameter k we show that the problem
is W[1]-hard, even for anonymous bundling functions and for maximum bundle size three.
Theorem 1. Plurality-C-CC-AV is NP-hard and W[1]-hard when parameterized by the so-
lution size k, even when the maximum bundle size b is three and the bundling function is anony-
mous.
Proof. We provide a parameterized reduction from the W[1]-hard problem Clique parameter-
ized by the parameter h [13], which asks for the existence of a size-h clique in an input graph G.
Clique
Input: An undirected graph G = (V (G), E(G)) and h ∈ N.
Question: Does G admit a size-h clique, that is, a size-h vertex subset U ⊆ V (G)
such that G[U ] is complete?
Let (G, h) be a Clique instance. Without loss of generality, we assume that G is connected,
that h ≥ 3, and that each vertex in G has degree at least h− 1. We construct an election E =
(C, V ) with C := {p, w, g} ∪ {ce | e ∈ E(G)}. The registered voter set V consists of
(
h
2
)
+ h
voters each with preference order w ≻ 〈C \ {w}〉, another
(
h
2
)
voters each with preference
order g ≻ 〈C \ {g}〉, and another h voters each with preference order p ≻ 〈C \ {p}〉. For each
vertex u ∈ V (G), we define C(u) := {ce | e ∈ E(G) ∧ u ∈ e}, and construct the set W of
unregistered voters as follows:
(i) For each vertex u ∈ V (G), we add an unregistered g-voter wu with preference order g ≻
〈C(u)〉 ≻ 〈C \ ({g} ∪ C(u))〉, and we set κ(wu) = {wu}. We call these unregistered voters
vertex voters.
(ii) For each edge e = {u, u′} ∈ E(G), we add an unregistered p-voter we with preference
order p ≻ ce ≻ 〈C \ {p, ce}〉, and we set κ(we) = {wu, wu′ , we}. We call these unregistered
voters edge voters.
7
Since all the unregistered voters have different preference orders (this is so because G is con-
nected, h ≥ 3, and each vertex has degree at least h − 1), every bundling function for our
instance, κ included, is anonymous. To finalize our construction, we set k :=
(
h
2
)
.
We show that G has a size-h clique if and only if (E = (C, V ),W, κ, p, k) is a yes instance for
Plurality-C-CC-AV. For the “if” part, suppose that there is a subset W ′ of at most k voters
such that p wins the election (C, V ∪ κ(W ′)). We show that the vertex set U ′ := {u ∈ V (G) |
we ∈ W ′ ∧ u ∈ e} is a size-h clique for G. First, we observe that p needs at least
(
h
2
)
points to
become a winner because of the difference in scores between the initial winner w and p. By our
construction, only bundles that include the edge voters give points to p and each of such bundles
gives p exactly one point. Since we can add at most k =
(
h
2
)
bundles, we must add exactly k
bundles of the edge voters. This means that E(G[U ′]) contains at least k edges. However, in
order to ensure p’s victory, κ(W ′) may only give at most h additional points to g. This means
that U ′ contains at most h vertices. With |E(G[U ′])| ≥ k, we conclude that U ′ is of size h and,
hence, is a size-h clique for G.
For the “only if” part, suppose that U ′ ⊆ V (G) is a size-h clique for G. We construct the
subsetW ′ by adding to it any edge voter we with e ∈ E(G[U ′]). Obviously, |W ′| = k. Now it easy
to check that p co-wins with both w and g the election (C, V ∪κ(W ′)) with score
(
h
2
)
+h+1.
If we drop the anonymity requirement for the bundling function, then we obtain a stronger
intractability result. For parameter k, the problem becomesW[2]-hard, even for two alternatives.
This is quite remarkable because typically election problems with a small number of alterna-
tives are easy (they can be solved either through brute-force attacks or through integer linear
programming attacks employing the famous FPT algorithm of Lenstra [26]; see the survey of
Betzler et al. [4] for examples, but note that there are also known examples of problems where
a small number of alternatives does not seem to help [9]). Further, since our proof uses only
two alternatives, it applies to almost all natural voting rules: For two alternatives almost all of
them (including the Condorcet rule) are equivalent to the Plurality rule. The reduction is from
the W[2]-complete problem Set Cover parameterized by the solution size [13].
Theorem 2. Both Plurality-C-CC-AV and Condorcet-C-CC-AV parameterized by the
solution size k are W[2]-hard, even for two alternatives.
Proof. We provide a parameterized reduction from the W[2]-complete problem Set Cover
parameterized by the parameter h [13].
Set Cover
Input: A collection S = {S1, . . . , Sm} of subsets of the universe X = {x1, . . . , xn}
and h ∈ N.
Question: Is there a size-h subset S ′ ⊆ S that covers the universe, that is,
⋃
S ′ =
X?
Let (S,X, h) be a Set Cover instance. We construct an electionE = (C, V ) with C = {p, g}.
The registered voter set V consists of only (n−k) g-voters. We construct the unregistered voter
set W as follows:
(i) For each element xi ∈ X , we construct one p-voter, denoted by wxi (called element-voter),
and two g-voters, denoted by wdi1 and w
d
i2 (called dummy-voters), and we set κ(w
x
i ) =
{wxi , w
d
i1 , w
d
i2} and set κ(w
d
i1 ) = κ(w
d
i2 ) = {w
d
i1 , w
d
i2}.
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(ii) For each set Sj , we construct one g-voter, denoted by w
S
j
(called set-voter), and we set
κ(wSj ) = {w
S
j } ∪ {w
x
i | xi ∈ Sj}. That is, the bundle for the voter corresponding to a set
contains all of the voters corresponding to the elements of the set.
Finally, we set k := h and let d be arbitrary.
The construction is obviously a parameterized reduction, and we show now that there is
a size-h subset S ′ ⊆ S that covers the universe if and only if there is a size-k subset W ′ of
unregistered voters, such that if added (with their respective bundles) to the election, p becomes
a Plurality winner of the election.
For the “if” part, suppose that there is such a size-k subset W ′. Also, if there are some
element-voters in the solution, then we can simply remove them, as they do not help p win, due
to the dummy-voters . The only way to achieve the score increase of n − k for p is to have all
of the element-voters added to the election, and this can be done only by covering all of the
universe, with at most k set-voters ; therefore, the solution corresponds to a set covering of the
universe.
For the “only if” part, given a size-h subset S ′ ⊆ S that covers the universe, we choose, for
every Sj ∈ S′, its respective voter wSj , and add it to the election. This gives a size-k subset W
′
of unregistered voters, which easily can be verified to result in p winning the election.
As for the Condorcet rule, we use the same unregistered voters as defined above and we
construct the original election with (2n− k − 1) g-voters and (n− k) p-voters.
The above proof uses the non-anonymity of the bundling function in a crucial way. If we
require the bundling function to be anonymous, then C-CC-AV can be formulated as an integer
linear program where the number of variables and the number of constraints are bounded by
some function in the number m of alternatives. The idea behind this is that with anonymity we
can formulate our problem through an integer linear program where the number of variables and
the number of constraints are bounded by some function in m. Such integer linear programs are
in FPT with respect to the number of variables [26].
Theorem 3. For anonymous bundling functions, both Plurality-C-CC-AV and Condorcet-
C-CC-AV parameterized by the number m of alternatives are fixed-parameter tractable.
Proof. We describe an integer linear program (ILP) with at most m! variables and at most
m!+m constraints that solves both Plurality-C-CC-AV and Condorcet-C-CC-AV. Fixed-
parameter tractability then follows, since any ILP with ρ variables and L input bits is solvable
in O(ρ2.5ρ+o(ρ)L) time ([26] and [25]).
With m alternatives, there are at most m! voters with pairwise different preference orders
in a given election. For each alternative a ∈ C, let s(a) be its initial score. Since the voters are
anonymous, there are at most m! different bundles. Furthermore, we can assume that all voters
in W ′ have pairwise different preference orders (this is because, due to anonymity, there is no
additional gain of adding two voters with the same preference order).
Let ≻1,≻2, . . . ,≻m! be an ordering of all of the possible preference orders overm alternatives.
For i ∈ [m!], let Ni be the number of voters with preference order ≻i in W . For i ∈ [m!] and
j ∈ [m!], let M ji have value 1 if there is a voter with preference order ≻j that is in the bundle of
a voter whose preference order is ≻i, and otherwise 0. For each alternative a and each i ∈ [m!],
let Bai = 1 if alternative a is at the first position in the preference order ≻i (that is, i is a
a-voter), and otherwise Bai = 0.
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For each preference order ≻i, i ∈ [m!], we introduce one boolean variable xi, with the intent
that the value of xi will be 1 if and only if W
′ contains a voter with preference order i. Indeed,
an integer linear program usually tries to minimize or maximize a certain function, while here,
we write the integer linear program as simply a feasibility problem. It can be easily rewritten
with a minimization function instead. Now we are ready to state the integer linear program.
∑
i∈[m!]
xi ≤ k, (1)
xi ≤ Ni ∀i ∈ [m!], (2)
∑
i∈[m!]
∑
j∈[m!]
(Baj −B
p
j ) ·Nj ·M
j
i · xi < s(p)− s(a) ∀a ∈ C \ {p}. (3)
Constraint (1) ensures that at most k voters are added to W ′. Constraint (2) ensures that
the voters added to W ′ are available in W . Constraint (3) ensures that no other alternative has
a higher Plurality score than alternative p. It can be easily verified that there is a solution for
this integer linear program if and only if there is a solution to the input instance.
3.2 Combinatorial Parameters
We focus now on the complexity of Plurality-C-CC-AV as a function of two combinatorial
parameters: (a) the maximum swap distance d between the leader and his followers in one
bundle, and (b) the maximum size b of each voter’s bundle.
Specifically, we show that if κ is a d-bounded bundling function (that is, it is not required to
contain all voters at a given distance), then Plurality-C-CC-AV is polynomial-time solvable if
the maximum bundle size is one, but if the maximum bundle size is two, then Plurality-C-CC-
AV is NP-hard. However, if κ is a full-d bundling function (that is, if is required to contain all
voters at a given distance), then Plurality-C-CC-AV is polynomial-time solvable if the maximum
bundle size is two, but if the maximum bundle size is three, then Plurality-C-CC-AV is NP-hard.
First, if b = 1, then C-CC-AV reduces to CC-AV and, thus, can be solved by a greedy
algorithm in polynomial time [2].
Observation 3. If the maximum bundle size b is one, then Plurality-C-CC-AV is polynomial-
time solvable.
However, for arbitrary bundling functions, Plurality-C-CC-AV becomes intractable as
soon as b = 2.
Theorem 4. Plurality-C-CC-AV is NP-hard even if the maximum bundle size b is two.
Proof. We provide a reduction from a restricted variant of the NP-complete problem 3SAT,
where each clause has either two or three literals, each variable occurs exactly four times, twice
as a positive literal, and twice as a negative literal.
(2,2)-3SAT
Input: A collection C of clauses over the set X = {x1, . . . , xn} of variables such that
each clause has either two or three literals, and each variable appears exactly four
times, twice as a positive literal and twice as a negative literal.
Question: Is there a truth assignment that satisfies all the clauses in C?
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(b) Gadget used in Theorem 6
Figure 1: Part of the construction used in Theorem 4 and Theorem 6. Specifically, we show the
cycle corresponding to variable xj which occurs as a negative literal in clauses Ci and Cs and
as a positive literal in clauses Cr and Ct.
This variant is still NP-hard since from Tovey [37, Theorem 2.1], one obtained NP-hardness
for 3SAT where each clause has either two or three literals, each variable occurs either two or
three times, and at most one time as a negative literal.
We can reduce from this problem to (2,2)-3SAT as follows. First, we assume that no
variable appears only positively, because if this is the case, we can just set it to true and remove
it. For each variable xi that appears three times (two times positively and one time negatively),
we add one new variable yi, and two new clauses {¬xi,¬yi,¬yi} and {¬yi,¬yi}. For each
variable xi that appears two times (one time positively and one time negatively), we add one
new clause {¬xi, xi}. It can be verified that the original instance is a yes-instance if and only if
the newly constructed instance is a yes-instance for (2,2)-3SAT.
Now, given a (2,2)-3SAT instance (C,X ), where C is the set of clauses over the set of
variables X , we construct an election (C, V ). We set k := 4|X |, and construct the set C of
alternatives to be C := {p, w}∪{ci | Ci ∈ C}, where the ci are called the clause alternatives. We
construct the set V of registered voters such that the initial score of w is 4|X |, the initial score
of the clause alternative ci is 4|X | − |Ci|+ 1 (where |Ci| is the number of literals that clause Ci
contains), and the initial score of p is zero. We construct the set W of unregistered voters as
follows (throughout the rest of the proof, we will often write ℓj to refer to a literal that contains
variable xj ; depending on the context, ℓj will mean either xj or ¬xj and the exact meaning will
always be clear):
1. for each variable xj ∈ X , we construct four p-voters, denoted by p
j
1, p
j
2, p
j
3, p
j
4; we call such
voters variable voters.
2. for each clause Ci ∈ C and each literal ℓ contained in Ci, we construct a ci-voters, denoted
by cℓi ; we call such voter a clause voter. Note that clause Ci has exactly |Ci| corresponding
clause voters.
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We define the assignment function κ as follows: For each variable xj ∈ X that occurs as a
negative literal (¬xj) in clauses Ci and Cs, and as a positive literal (xj) in clauses Cr and Ct,
we set
κ(pj1) := {p
j
1, c
¬xj
i }, κ(c
¬xj
i ) := {c
¬xj
i , p
j
2},
κ(pj2) := {p
j
2, c
xj
r }, κ(c
xj
r ) := {c
xj
r , p
j
3},
κ(pj3) := {p
j
3, c
¬xj
s )}, κ(c
¬xj
s ) := {c
¬xj
s , p
j
4},
κ(pj4) := {p
j
4, c
xj
t }, κ(c
xj
t ) := {c
xj
t , p
j
1}.
Notice that the bundling graph (Definition 3) contains a cycle corresponding to each variable,
as depicted in Figure 1a.
The general idea is that in order to let p win, all p-voters must be in κ(W ′) and no clause
alternative ci should gain more than (|Ci| − 1) points. More formally, we show now that (C,X )
has a satisfying truth assignment if and only if there is a size-k subset W ′ ⊆W such that p wins
election (C, V ∪ κ(W ′)) (recall that k = 4|X |).
For the “if” direction, let β : X → {T, F} be a satisfying truth assignment function for (C,X ).
Intuitively, β will guide us through constructing the set W ′ in the following way: First, for each
variable xj , we put into W
′ those voters c
ℓj
i for whom β sets ℓj to false. This way in κ(W
′) we
include 2|X | p-voters and, for each clause ci, at most (|Ci| − 1) ci-voters. The former is true
because exactly |X | literals are set to false by β, each literal is included in exactly two clauses,
and adding each c
ℓj
i into W
′ also includes a unique p-voter into κ(W ′); the latter is true because
if β is a satisfying truth assignment then each clause Ci contains at most (|Ci| − 1) literals set
to false. Then, for each clause voter c
ℓj
i already in W
′, we also add the voter pja, 1 ≤ a ≤ 4,
that contains c
ℓj
i in his or her bundle. This way we include in κ(W
′) additional 2|X | p-voters
without increasing the number of clause voters included. Formally, we define W ′ as follows:
W ′ :={c
¬xj
i , p
j
a | ¬xj ∈ Ci ∧ β(xj) = T ∧ c
¬xj
i ∈ κ(p
j
a)}∪
{c
xj
i , p
j
a | xj ∈ Ci ∧ β(xj) = F ∧ c
¬xj
i ∈ κ(p
j
a)}.
As per our intuitive argument, one can verify that all p-voters are contained in κ(W ′) and each
clause alternative ci gains at most (|Ci| − 1) points.
For the “only if” part, let W ′ be a subset of voters such that p wins election (C, V ∪κ(W ′)).
First, we make the following observation. Let xj be some variable and consider clauses Ci
and Cs where literal ¬xj appears, and clauses Cr and Ct where literal xj appears. We claim that
we can assume that κ(W ′) contains at most two voters among c
¬xj
i , c
¬xj
s , c
xj
r , and c
xj
t . First, let
us assume that κ(W ′) contains all of these voters. Since p is a winner of election (C, V ∪κ(W ′)),
it must be that κ(W ′) also contains all four p-voters of the form pja, 1 ≤ a ≤ 4. This means that
W ′ includes at least four voters from the set:
Qj = {c
¬xj
i , c
¬xj
s , c
xj
r , c
xj
t , p
j
1, p
j
2, p
j
3, p
j
4}.
In effect, we can replace W ′ with W ′′ defined as
W ′′ := (W ′ \Qj) ∪ {c
xj
r } ∪ {p
j
a | c
xj
r ∈ κ(p
j
a)} ∪ {c
xj
t } ∪ {p
j
a | c
xj
t ∈ κ(p
j
a)}.
Compared to W ′, W ′′ contains at most as many voters as W ′ does, κ(W ′′) contains the same
number of p-voters as κ(W ′) does, and for each clause alternative c, κ(W ′′) contains no more
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c-voters than κ(W ′) does. Thus, p is still a winner of election (C, V ∪κ(W ′′)) and W ′′ is a valid
solution.
Furthermore, let us assume that exactly three voters among c
¬xj
i , c
¬xj
s , c
xj
r , and c
xj
t are
included in κ(W ′). For the sake of concreteness, let c
¬xj
i be the voter not in κ(W
′). We use a
similar argument as before. Specifically, since p is a winner of (C, V ∪κ(W ′)),W ′ must include at
least four voters among those in Qj. ReplacingW
′ withW ′′ (defined in the previous paragraph)
works again. Notice that, replacing W ′ with W ′′ would also work if c
¬xj
s was the voter not
included in W ′; if either c
xj
r or c
xj
t were the not-included voter, we would replace W
′ with
W ′′′ := (W ′ \Qj) ∪ {c
¬xj
i } ∪ {p
j
a | c
¬xj
i ∈ κ(p
j
a)} ∪ {c
¬xj
s } ∪ {p
j
a | c
¬xj
s ∈ κ(p
j
a)}.
We will now argue that for each variable xj , κ(W
′) contains either the two voters of the
form cxj or the two voters of the form c¬xj . We start by observing that for each two clauses
that contain the same variable but not the same literal, at least one corresponding clause voter
must be added to the election (otherwise κ(W ′) would not contain all the unregistered p-voters).
Thus, if one clause voter is not contained in κ(W ′), then both of its “neighboring” (in the sense
of being adjacent in the bundling graph, depicted in Figure 1a) clause voters must be included in
κ(W ′). Together with the arguments from previous paragraphs, this means that for each variable
xj , κ(W
′) either contains the two voters of the form cxj or the two voters of the form c¬xj .
This is critical for the sanity of the truth assignment function β we will construct now. In
order to let p win, all p-voters must be added to the election. This means that for each two
clauses that contain the same variable but not the same literal, at least one corresponding clause
voter must be added to the election.
We set β : X → {T, F} such that β(xj) := T if there is a clause voter c
xj
i /∈ κ(W
′), and
β(xj) := F if there is a clause voter c
¬xj
i /∈ κ(W
′). Following the previous arguments, function β
is well-defined. It is a satisfying truth assignment function for (C,X ) because for each clause Ci,
by the fact that p is a winner in election (C, V ∪ κ(W ′)), we have that κ(W ′) contains at most
(|Ci| − 1) ci-voters for each clause alternative ci. This is possible only if each clause contains at
least one literal ℓ such that β sets ℓ to truth.
The situation is different for full-d bundling functions, because we can extend the greedy
algorithm by Bartholdi et al. [2] to bundles of size two.
Theorem 5. If κ is a full-d bundling function and the maximum bundle size b is two, then
Plurality-C-CC-AV is polynomial-time solvable.
Proof. Since b = 2 and κ is a full-d bundling function, the bundling graph has maximum degree
one. Therefore, it contains only isolated vertices and disjoint edges. We first add the disjoint
edges with both end-points corresponding to p-voters. If we have some more budget, then we add
isolated vertices corresponding to p-voters. We are left only with isolated vertices corresponding
to non-p-voters, which we throw away, disjoint edges with both end-points corresponding to non-
p-voters, which we also throw away, and disjoint edges with one end-point corresponding to a
p-voter and another end-point corresponding to a non-p-voter, which we treat now. Specifically,
we add these disjoint edges with one end-point corresponding to a p-voter and another end-point
corresponding to a non-p-voter, sorted ascendingly by the current score of the non-p-voter.
However, as soon as b = 3, we obtain NP-hardness, by modifying the reduction used in
Theorem 4.
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Theorem 6. If κ is a full-d bundling function, then Plurality-C-CC-AV is NP-hard even if
the maximum bundle size b is three.
Proof. We use a similar reduction as in the proof of Theorem 4, with the only difference that
we introduce eight p-voters for each variable instead of four b-voters. We set the full-d bundling
function κ such that each variable voter’s bundle consists of two variable voters and one clause
voter, and such that each clause voter’s bundle also consists of two variable voters and one clause
voter. Now the cycle corresponding to each variable consists of twelve vertices, as depicted in
Figure 1b. Moreover, κ is full-d for some d. The correctness proof is analogous to the one shown
for Theorem 4.
Taking also the swap distance d into account, we find out that both Plurality-C-CC-AV
and Condorcet-C-CC-AV are NP-hard, even if d = 1. This stands in contrast to the case
where d = 0, where R-C-CC-AV reduces to the CC-AV problem (perhaps for the weighted
voters [19]), which, for Plurality voting, is polynomial-time solvable by a simple greedy algorithm.
Theorem 7. Plurality-C-CC-AV is NP-hard even for full-1 bundling functions and even if
the maximum bundle size b is four.
Proof. The theorem follows from the proof of Theorem 8, applied to a reduction from Vertex
Cover, for graphs with maximum vertex degree equal to three. Vertex Cover remains NP-
complete in this case [21].
4 Single-Peaked and Single-Crossing Elections
In this section, we focus on instances with full-d bundling functions, and we do so because without
this restriction the hardness results from previous sections easily translate to our restricted
domains (at least for the case of the Plurality rule). We find that the results for the combinatorial
variant of control by adding voters for single-peaked and single-crossing elections are quite
different than those for the non-combinatorial case. Indeed, both for Plurality and for Condorcet,
the voter control problems for single-peaked elections and for single-crossing elections are solvable
in polynomial time for the non-combinatorial case [7, 18, 29]. For the combinatorial case, we
show hardness for both Plurality-C-CC-AV and Condorcet-C-CC-AV for single-peaked
elections, but give polynomial-time algorithms for single-crossing elections. We mention that
the intractability results can also be seen as regarding anonymous bundling functions because
all full-d bundling functions are leader-anonymous and follower-anonymous.
We begin with single-peaked elections.
Theorem 8. Both Plurality-C-CC-AV and Condorcet-C-CC-AV parameterized by the
solution size k are W[1]-hard for single-peaked elections, even for full-1 bundling functions.
Proof. We provide a parameterized reduction from the W[1]-hard problem Partial Vertex
Cover (PVC) with respect to the “solution size” parameter h [23], which asks for a set of at
most h vertices in a graph G, which intersects with at least ℓ edges. More formally:
Partial Vertex Cover (PVC)
Input: An undirected graph G = (V (G), E(G)) and h, ℓ ∈ N.
Question: Does G admits a size-h vertex subset U ⊆ V (G) which intersects at least
ℓ edges in G?
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Given a PVC instance (G, h, ℓ), we set k := h, and construct an election E = (C, V ) with
C := {p, w} ∪ {ai, ai, bi, bi | ui ∈ V (G)} such that the initial score of w is h + ℓ and the initial
scores of all the other alternatives are zero. We do so by creating h + ℓ registered voters who
all have the same preference order ≻ such that it differs from the following canonical preference
order :
p ≻ w ≻ a1 ≻ a1 ≻ . . . ≻ a|V (G)| ≻ a|V (G)| ≻ b1 ≻ b1 ≻ . . . ≻ b|V (G)| ≻ b|V (G)|
by only the first pair {p, w} of alternatives.
For each set P of disjoint pairs of alternatives, neighboring with respect to the canonical
preference order, we define the preference order diff-order(P ) to be identical to the canonical
preference order, except that all the pairs of alternatives in P are swapped. The unregistered
voter set W is constructed as follows:
(i) for each edge e = {ui, uj} ∈ E(G), we create an edge voter we with preference or-
der diff-order({{ai, ai}, {aj, aj}}) (we say that we corresponds to edge e),
(ii) for each edge e = {ui, uj} ∈ E(G), we create a dummy voter de with preference or-
der diff-order({{p, w}, {ai, ai}, {aj, aj}}) (we say that de corresponds to edge e), and
(iii) for each vertex ui ∈ V (G), we create a vertex voter wui with preference order diff-order({{ai, ai}})
(we say that wui corresponds to ui).
The preference orders of the voters in V ∪W are single-peaked with respect to the axis
〈B〉 ≻ 〈A〉 ≻ p ≻ w ≻ 〈A〉 ≻ 〈B〉,
where
〈B〉 := b|V (G)| ≻ b|V (G)|−1 ≻ . . . ≻ b1, 〈A〉 := a|V (G)| ≻ a|V (G)|−1 ≻ . . . ≻ a1,
〈B〉 := b1 ≻ b2 ≻ . . . ≻ b|V (G)|, 〈A〉 := a1 ≻ a2 ≻ . . . ≻ a|V (G)|.
Finally, we define the function κ such that it is a full-1 bundling function. To understand how
κ works, we carefully calculate the swap distance between the preference orders of all possible
pairs of voters in W . We see that:
(a) any two edge voters have swap distance at least two,
(b) any edge voter and any dummy voter have swap distance exactly one if they correspond to
the same edge, and at least three otherwise,
(c) any edge voter we and any vertex voter w
u
i have swap distance one if ui ∈ e, and three
otherwise,
(d) any two dummy voters have swap distance at least two,
(e) any dummy voter and any vertex voter have swap distance at least two, and
(f) any two vertex voters have swap distance two.
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Thus, for each edge e = {ui, uj} ∈ E(G) we have κ(we) := {we, wui , w
u
j , de} and κ(de) :=
{we, de}, and for each vertex ui ∈ V (G) we have κ(wui ) := {w
u
i } ∪ {we | ui ∈ e ∈ E(G)}.
We show that (G, h, ℓ) is a yes-instance for PVC if and only if there is a size-k subsetW ′ ⊆W
such that p is a Plurality winner of the election (C, V ∪κ(W ′)). Note that all unregistered voters
except the dummy voters prefer p over all other alternatives and that p needs at least h+ℓ points
in order to win.
For the “only if” part, suppose that X ⊆ V (G) is a size-h vertex set and Y ⊆ E(G) is a size-ℓ
edge set such that for every edge e ∈ Y it holds that e ∩X 6= ∅. We set W ′ := {wui | ui ∈ X},
and it is easy to verify that κ(W ′) consists of h vertex voters and at least ℓ edge voters. Each of
them gives p one point if added to the election. This results in p being a winner of the election
with score at least h+ ℓ.
For the “if” part, suppose that there is a size-k subset W ′ ⊆ W such that p is a Plurality
winner of the election (C, V ∪ κ(W ′)). Observe that if W ′ contains some dummy voter de,
then we can replace it with we (if we is already in W
′ then we can simply remove de from
W ′). Thus we can assume that W ′ does not contain any dummy voters. Now, assume that W ′
contains some edge voter we, where e = {ui, uj}. Since, by the previous argument, W ′ does not
contain de, we have that de is not a member of κ(W
′ \ {we}). This means that if both wui and
wuj belong to κ(W
′ \ {we}) then we can safely remove we from W ′; p will still be a winner of
the election (C, V ∪ κ(W ′ \ {we})). On the other hand, assume that exactly one of wui , wuj
does not belong to κ(W ′ \ {we}) and let wu be this voter. It is easy to see that p is a winner of
election (C, V ∪ κ((W ′ \ {we}) ∪ {wu})) (the net effect of including the bundle of we is that p’s
score increases by at most one, whereas the net effect of including the bundle of wu is that p’s
score increases by at least one). Similarly, if neither ui nor uj belong to κ(W
′ \ {we}), then it is
easy to verify that p is a winner of the election (C, V ∪ κ((W ′ \ {we}) ∪ {wui})). All in all, we
can assume that W ′ contains vertex voters only. Since all vertex voters are p-voters, without
loss of generality we can assume that W ′ contains exactly k = h of them.
We define X := {ui | wui ∈ W
′} such that |X | = k, and Y := {e ∈ E(G) | e ∩ ui 6= ∅}. By
the construction of the edge voters’ preference orders, κ(W ′) consists of k vertex voters and |Y |
edge voters. This must add up to at least h + ℓ voters. Therefore, |Y | ≥ ℓ, implying that at
least ℓ edges are covered by X .
As for the Condorcet rule, we use the same unregistered voters as defined above and construct
the original election with h+ℓ−1 registered voters whose preference orders are diff-order({w, p}).
Using the same reasoning as used for the Plurality rule, one can verify that (G, h, ℓ) is a yes-
instance for PVC if and only if there is a size-k subset W ′ ⊆ W such that p is a Condorcet
winner of the election (C, V ∪ κ(W ′)).
We now present some tractability results for single-crossing elections. Consider an R-
C-CC-AV instance ((C, V ),W, d, κ, p ∈ C, k), containing an election (C, V ) and an unregistered
voter set W such that (C, V ∪ W ) is single-crossing, and thus, both (C, V ) and (C,W ) are
single-crossing. This has a crucial consequence for full-d bundling functions: For each unreg-
istered voter w ∈ W , the voters in bundle κ(w) appear consecutively along the single-crossing
order restricted to only the voters in W .2 Using the following lemmas, we can show that Plu-
rality-C-CC-AV and Condorcet-C-CC-AV are polynomial-time solvable in some cases.
2Note that for each single-crossing election, the order of the voters possessing the single-crossing property is,
in essence, unique. (modulo voters with the same preference orders and modulo the fact that if an order witnesses
the single-crossing property of an election, then its reverse does so as well).
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Lemma 2. Let I = ((C, V ),W, d, κ, p ∈ C, k) be a Plurality-C-CC-AV instance such that
(C, V ∪W ) is single-crossing and κ is a full-d bundling function. Then, the following statements
hold:
(i) The p-voters are ordered consecutively along the single-crossing order.
(ii) If I is a yes instance, then there is a subset W ′ ⊆W of size at most k such that all bundles
of voters w ∈ W ′ contain only p-voters, except at most two bundles which may contain
some non-p-voters.
Proof. Let n := |W | and let α := 〈w1, w2, . . . , wn〉 be a single-crossing order of the voters in W .
Item (i) follows directly from the definition of the single-crossing property.
As for Item (ii), letW ′ ⊆W be a size-k subset of unregistered voters such that p is a Plurality
winner in election (C, V ∪ κ(W ′)). For each subset S ⊆ W of voters, we use 1st(S) (resp.
2nd(S)) to denote the index j (resp. j′) of the first voter wj ∈ S (resp. the last voter wj′ ∈ S)
along the single-crossing order. Suppose that there are two bundles, κ(wi) and κ(wj), with
1st(κ(wi)) ≤ 1st(κ(wj)) such that both contain non-p-voters and the first p-voter along α. If
2nd(κ(wi)) ≤ 2nd(κ(wj)), then κ(wi) does not contain more p-voters than κ(wj) does, while
containing at least as many non-p-voters as κ(wj). Thus, we can remove wi fromW
′. Otherwise,
2nd(κ(wi)) > 2nd(κ(wj)), which means that κ(wj) ⊂ κ(wi). Thus, we can remove wj from W ′.
In any case, we conclude that W ′ contains at most one voter w whose bundle κ(w) contains a
non-p-voter and the first p-voter (along the single-crossing order).
Analogously, we can show that W ′ contains at most one voter w whose bundle κ(w) contains
a non-p-voter and the last p-voter (along the single-crossing order). Since for each bundle κ(w)
with w ∈ W ′, if κ(w) contains a non-p-voter, then it contains at least one of the first and last
voters along α, every bundle κ(w) with w ∈ W ′ contains at least one p-voter (because if it does
not, then we can remove its respective leader voter, as the bundle does not help p), and Item (ii)
follows.
For Condorcet voting, we use the well-known median-voter theorem (we provide the proof
for the sake of completeness).
Lemma 3. Let (C, V ∪κ(W ′)) be a single-crossing election with single-crossing voter order 〈x1, x2,
. . . , xz〉 and set Xmedian := {x⌈z/2⌉} ∪ {xz/2+1 if z is even}, where z = |V | + |κ(W
′)|. Alterna-
tive p is a (unique) Condorcet winner in (C, V ∪ κ(W ′)) if and only if every voter in Xmedian is
a p-voter.
Proof. Let X1 be the set of voters x1, x2, . . . , x⌈z/2⌉−1 and let X2 be the set of voters V ∪κ(W
′)\
(X1 ∪Xmedian).
For the “if” part, let c be an arbitrary alternative from C \ {p}. Then, if there is some voter
in X1 which prefers c over p, then all voters in Xmedian ∪ X2 prefer p over c. If there is some
voter in X2 which prefers c over p, then all voters in X1 ∪Xmedian prefer p over c. In any case,
a strict majority of voters prefer p over c. Thus, p is the (unique) Condorcet winner.
For the “only if” part, suppose for the sake of contradiction that there is a voter in Xmedian
which is not a p-voter but a c-voter with c ∈ C \ {p}. Then, analogously to the reasoning above,
at least half of the voters will prefer c over p—a contradiction.
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With these two lemmas available, we give polynomial-time algorithms for both Plurality-
C-CC-AV and Condorcet-C-CC-AV, for the case of single-crossing elections and full-d bun-
dling functions.
Theorem 9. Both Plurality-C-CC-AV and Condorcet-C-CC-AV are polynomial-time
solvable for the single-crossing case with full-d bundling functions.
Proof. First, we find a (unique) single-crossing voter order for (C, V ∪W ) in quadratic time [14,
8]. Due to Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, we only need to store the most preferred alternative of
each voter to find the solution set W ′. Thus, the running-time from now on only depends on
the number of voters. We start with the Plurality rule and let α := 〈w1, w2, . . . , w|W |〉 be a
single-crossing voter order.
Due to Lemma 2 (ii), the two bundles in κ(W ′) which may contain non-p-voters appear at
the beginning and at the end of the p-voter block, along the single-crossing order. We first guess
these two bundles, and after this initial guess, all remaining bundles in the solution contain only
p-voters (Lemma 2 (i)). Thus, the remaining task is to find the maximum score that p can gain
by selecting k′ bundles containing only p-voters. This problem is equivalent to the Maximum
Interval Cover problem, which is solvable in O(|W |2) time (Golab et al. [22, Section 3.2]).
For the Condorcet rule, we propose a slightly different algorithm. The goal is to find a
minimum-size subset W ′ ⊆W such that p is the (unique) Condorcet winner in (C, V ∪ κ(W ′)).
Let β := 〈x1, x2, . . . , xz〉 be a single-crossing voter order for (C, V ∪W ). Considering Lemma 3,
we begin by guessing at most two voters in V ∪ W whose bundles may contain the median
p-voter (or, possibly, several p-voters) along the single-crossing order of voters restricted to the
final election (for simplicity, we define the bundle of each registered voter to be its singleton).
The voters in the union of these two bundles must be consecutively ordered. Let those voters
be xi, xi+1, . . . , xi+j (where i ≥ 1 and j ≥ 0), let W1 := {xs ∈ W | s < i}, and let W2 := {xs ∈
W | s > i+ j}. We guess two integers z1 ≤ |W1| and z2 ≤ |W1| with the property that there are
two subsets B1 ⊆W1 and B2 ⊆W2 with |B1| = z1 and |B2| = z2 such that the median voter(s)
in V ∪B1∪{xi, xi+1, . . . , xi+j}∪B2 are indeed p-voters (for now, only the sizes z1 and z2 matter,
not the actual sets). These four guesses cost O(|V ∪W |2 · |W |2) time. The remaining task is to
find two minimum-size subsets W ′1 and W
′
2 such that κ(W
′
1) ⊆W1, κ(W
′
2) ⊆W2, |κ(W
′
1)| = z1,
and |κ(W ′2)| = z2. As already discussed, this can be done in O(|W |
2) time [22]. We conclude
that one can find a minimum-size subset W ′ ⊆W such that p is the (unique) Condorcet winner
in (C, V ∪ κ(W ′)) in O(|V ∪W |2 · |W |4) time.
5 Conclusion
We provide opportunities for future research. First, we did not discuss destructive control
and the related problem of combinatorial deletion of voters. For Plurality, we conjecture that
combinatorial addition of voters for destructive control, and combinatorial deletion of voters for
either constructive or destructive control behave similarly to combinatorial addition of voters
for constructive control.
Another, even wider field of future research is to study other combinatorial voting models—
this may include controlling the swap distance, “probabilistic bundling”, “reverse bundling”, or
using other distance measures than the swap distance. Naturally, it would also be interesting
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to consider other problems than election control (with bribery being perhaps the most natural
candidate).
Finally, instead of studying a “leader-follower model” as we did, one might also be interested
in an “enemy model” referring to control by adding alternatives: The alternatives of an election
“hate” each other such that if one alternative is added to the election, then all of its enemies
are also added to the election. This scenario of combinatorial candidate control deserves future
investigation.
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